The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts, put forward independently by John 
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Torin Alter (forthcoming) has recently mounted an attack on the conditional analysis strategy. In this paper I will defend the strategy against Alter's objections.
I will proceed as follows. First, I will briefly review the zombie argument against physicalism. In the second section, I will describe the conditional analysis and explain how it is thought to provide an answer to the zombie problem. Finally, in the third section I will take a detailed look at the three objections given by Alter and present my replies to them.
Zombies and Physicalism
The zombie argument against physicalism is based on the zombie intuition: we can conceive of zombies, that is, creatures which are physically and functionally identical to us but which lack phenomenal consciousness. In other words, there is no conceptual incoherence in the idea of zombies; they are not like married bachelors or male vixens in that we cannot rule them out on purely conceptual grounds.
The zombie argument runs as follows:
(1) Zombies are conceivable.
(2) If zombies are conceivable, then they are possible.
(3) If zombies are possible, then physicalism is false. therefore, (4) Physicalism is false.
The argument is clearly valid, and the first premiss simply reports the zombie intuition (but see the discussion of Alter's third objection below). The third premiss follows fairly directly from familiar considerations about physicalism and supervenience. It is the second premiss that has received the most attention in recent literature, and the conditional analysis strategy can naturally be seen as a means of denying the inference from the conceivability of zombies to their possibility. 
The Conditional Analysis
According to the conditional analysis, our phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure, roughly as follows:
(CA1) If the world contains nonphysical states of the right sort, then our phenomenal concepts refer (rigidly) to those states.
(CA2) If the world is merely physical, then our phenomenal concepts refer (rigidly) to physical states that play the right sort of functional role. This is the formulation used by Alter; I will have reason to refine this formulation below, but for the time being (CA1) and (CA2) will do.
Hawthorne and BraddonMitchell argue for their conditional analyses by thought experiment, and it is not difficult to see how such experiments might provide evidence for something like (CA1) and (CA2). Just ask yourself what 'pain' would refer to if it were to turn out that there really are nonphysical pain states, and the answer seems clear: it refers to just those states. But were it to turn out that there are no such nonphysical pain states, we would not straight away conclude that there are no pains. Rather, we would conclude that 'pain' must refer to something (supervenient on the) physical. Reflection on cases such as these appears to show that our phenomenal concepts, in a way, would prefer non physical referents, but in the absence of such referents, suitable physical referents will do.
Before going on to Alter's objections, let me briefly review how the conditional analysis is supposed to provide the physicalist with a reply to the zombie argument.
Firstly, the conditional analysis seems to explain the zombie intuition: the possibility of zombies cannot be ruled out a priori. If the actual world contains nonphysical phenomenal states, zombies are possible: there is a physical duplicate of our world with the phenomenal stuff missing. On the other hand, if the actual world is merely physical, zombies are not possible: our phenomenal concepts will then denote something (supervenient on the) physical, and hence any physical duplicate of an actual human will also be a phenomenal duplicate. And since we cannot know a priori which kind of a world the actual world is, we cannot rule out the possibility of zombies a priori; this is why zombies are conceivable. 3 Secondly, the conditional analysis blocks the zombie argument by denying its second premise, for reasons already noted above. If the actual world contains non physical phenomenal states, zombies are possible, whereas if the actual world is merely physical, zombies are not possible. It follows that we cannot infer the metaphysical possibility of zombies from their conceivability. The conditional analysis provides, then, an explanation of why the second premiss of the zombie argument fails, while at the same time allowing us to maintain that there is, in general, a close link between conceivability and possibility. Phenomenal concepts are, it is safe to assume, special in having such a conditional structure, and it seems plausible that conceivability will entail possibility for propositions which do not contain such special concepts.
Alter on the Conditional Analysis
In his criticism of the conditional analysis strategy, Torin Alter presents three objections.
First, he claims that the conditionals employed in the analysis are not a priori, which they apparently should be for the response to work. Secondly, he complains that there must be something wrong with the strategy, since we could use a similar argument to undermine the conditional analysis itself. Thirdly, Alter thinks that the conditional analysis cannot account for the right zombie intuition, but only for something easily mistaken for the right one. I will now look at each of his objections in turn.
First Objection: Are the Conditionals A Priori?
The first objection is based on the observation that, in order for the conditional analysis strategy to work, conditionals (CA1) and (CA2) should be knowable a priori. The conditionals are supposed to allow that zombies are conceivable, i.e. that there is no conceptual incoherence in the supposition that zombies exist. If the conditionals are not a priori, they do not seem to have any bearing on the coherence or incoherence of this idea.
Alter claims that (CA1) and (CA2) are, in fact, not a priori:
The intuitive acceptability of the conditionals derives partly from our knowledge that states of consciousness exist. But, arguably, that knowledge is a posteriori:
it depends primarily on our having conscious experiences, such as pain.
Therefore, the justification for accepting the conditionals is a posteriori. (p. 6)
In response: I am willing to grant that knowledge of pains is a posteriori (although I have some doubts about the status of our knowledge of phenomenal consciousness in general; see my discussion of Alter's third objection below). I also accept that this makes the justification for (CA1) and (CA2) partly a posteriori. But we should note that (CA1) and (CA2) are just approximations of the conditional analysis; the true analysis has to be somewhat more detailed.
To see this, suppose that it were to turn out that we are entirely physical creatures, but that there are Martians whose phenomenal states are realised by something non physical. (CA1), as stated, would imply that our phenomenal concepts would refer to the Martians' nonphysical phenomenal states, and that clearly cannot be right. When we are doing the kinds of thought experiments which Hawthorne and BraddonMitchell claim to support the conditional analysis, we are tacitly supposing that we are talking about our sensations and our physical or nonphysical states which are somehow connected with these sensations. To make these tacit assumptions explicit, we should add them to the antecedents of the conditionals. We then arrive at something like the following (for pain):
(CA1') If the actual world contains nonphysical phenomenal states and our sensations of pain, and there is a nontrivial relationship between these two, then our concept of pain refers to these nonphysical states.
(CA2') If the actual world is merely physical, and contains our sensations of pain, and there is a nontrivial relationship between certain functional states and these sensations of pain, then our concept of pain refers to these functional states. (CA1') and (CA2') also succeed in blocking the zombie argument. They explain why zombies are conceivable (our experiences of pain notwithstanding) in the same way as (CA1) and (CA2) were claimed to do; and they show why we cannot infer from this that zombies are possible. For all we know a priori, the antecedent of either conditional might be true; that is why zombies are conceivable. But if the actual world is such that the antecedent of (CA2') is true, zombies are not possible.
An antiphysicalist might respond by granting that (CA1') and (CA2') are a priori, but that the antecedent of (CA2') can be ruled out on a priori grounds.
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The anti physicalist thinks, after all, that we can demonstrate a priori that our phenomenal states could not occur in a wholly physical world, and to assume otherwise would be to beg the question. The charge is that, in using the conditional analysis as an answer, the physicalist is presupposing that the antiphysicalist arguments fail.
It is true that the conditional analysis strategy relies on the conceptual coherence of a wholly physical world with pains (or other phenomenal states in it), and the anti physicalist will deny this. But we should keep in mind the overall dialectical situation.
The zombie argument is put forward as an argument against physicalism: it aims to show that the conceivability of zombies is inconsistent with physicalism, because it entails the possibility of zombies. The physicalist, in using the conditional analysis strategy, is of course relying on premises which he or she is otherwise committed to, such as the coherence of a physical world with pains. The physicalist is showing a way of allowing for the conceivability of zombies, while holding on to physicalism. Hence, the charge of questionbegging is misplaced. If the antiphysicalist were to succeed in showing that there is an incoherence in the notion of a wholly physical world with pains in it, then of course the conditional analysis would be useless against the zombie argument. But a physicalist, of course, does not think that there are such arguments. In responding to the zombie argument, it is totally legitimate for the physicalist to start out assuming that physicalism is otherwise coherent.
If it is, then the conditional analysis strategy is a way of accommodating for the zombie intuition. Other antiphysicalist arguments need to be dealt with separately. ... suppose an oracle tells us that the world is merely physical and that nothing plays the pain role. We would conclude that there are pains that, although merely physical, do not play the pain role. So, by parity of reasoning, we should conclude that it is not a priori that if the world is merely physical then 'pain' refers to physical states that play the pain role. This result contradicts the conditional analysis. (p. 11)
In effect, Alter is asking us to consider what we would say if the Oracle were to tell us that in the actual world, physicalism is true but all forms of functionalism are false. It is true that this example does contradict the rough characterisation of the conditional analysis given in (CA1) and (CA2). However, it is easily seen that it does not contradict the more precise one given in (CA1') and (CA2'). In the envisaged scenario, there is no nontrivial relationship between any functional states and our sensations of pain.
Therefore, the antecedent of (CA2') is false, and the conditional analysis does not entail that pains are functional states.
Of course, this does not completely answer Alter's criticism. If he is right (as I think he is) about what we would say in response to his imagined Oracle, then the example shows that the analysis is incomplete, and we will need a third clause. The details of the appropriate third clause would depend on how, exactly, the details of Alter's example are to be filled out. The upshot of all this is that complete conditional analysis of our phenomenal concepts will be more complex than the one given in (CA1') and (CA2'). I will not attempt to give that analysis here; it is enough for my purposes here to note that, whatever other conditionals the complete analysis will contain, it will contain (CA1') and (CA2'), or something very much like them. And as long as these conditionals are part of the analysis, the analysis will be able to block the zombie argument.
Third Objection: The Wrong Zombie Intuition?
Alter's third and final objection is that the conditional analysis does not, in fact, explain the real zombie intuition. His discussion focuses on a full zombie world: a possible world which is a physical duplicate of our world, but without phenomenal consciousness. About such a world, the conditional analysis entails a doubly modal claim: it is conceivable that a zombie world is possible. We cannot rule out a priori the possibility that the actual world contains nonphysical phenomenal states, and if this turns out to be the case, a zombie world is possible. And it is not at all clear to me that this is conceivable. When a proposition which we take to be false is nonetheless conceivable, we can make sense of how it might turn out to be true, even though it has seemed to be false, and this presupposes an appearance/reality distinction with respect to the proposition in question. In the case of our knowledge of our own phenomenal consciousness, such a distinction does not exist: if it has seemed to me that I am phenomenally conscious, then I have been phenomenally conscious. 8 Moreover, the conditional analysis is compatible with the direct conceivability of individual zombies. As we saw earlier, we cannot rule out a priori the possibility that the actual world contains nonphysical phenomenal states. If that is the case, then we can neither rule out the possibility that the actual world contains nonphysical phenomenal states (of the right sort) and also some physically and functionally normal humans who lack these states (that is, zombies.) And it seems to me that the direct conceivability of individual zombies is the real zombie intuition fueling the zombie argument: there is no conceptual incoherence in the supposition that there are beings which are physically like us but lack consciousness. For all that I know a priori, the actual world might contain creatures who are functionally like me, but who are unlike me in that they are not phenomenally conscious. This is the real zombie intuition, and the conditional analysis accounts for it without any problems. Alter has shown that the analysis originally given in (CA1) and (CA2) runs into problems. The analysis given above as (CA1') and (CA2') fares better, but is still shown to be incomplete by Alter's second objection; however, this incompleteness does not undermine the effectiveness of the strategy as an answer to the zombie argument. The precise content of the correct and complete conditional analysis of our phenomenal concepts will have to be left for another occasion, but whatever the details will be, we can rely on the analysis in explaining the zombie intuition in a manner consistent with physicalism.
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